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The Problem of Taxing Farmers in China 
 
Abstract 
This papers places the problem of Chinese rural taxation in the context of government 
regulation and tries to present an integrated theoretical framework of rural development in 
China in the past two decades.  Our theoretical framework can reconcile the stylized facts 
that the average level of rural taxation relative to rural net income after the 1990s did not 
increase very fast, but rural taxation became a very serious problem in this period. We found 
that this is in large part due to the increase of rural income disparity after 1990s and the 
uneven tax and fee distribution among different income groups. We argue that differentiated 
enforcement of the government regulations such as grain procurement and birth control play 
an important role in the rural taxation problem, and more generally, the problem of 
expanding local government size and rising rural income disparity. The empirical findings do 
support our hypothesis.   
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1. Introduction 
In recent years, the problem of rural taxation in China, especially that of increasing 
local informal charges on farmers, has become more acute. The central government has been 
aware of the problem for a decade, and has been taking various steps to alleviate the problem. 
Yet to date, these actions have met with limited success. In 2002, after a difficult 
decision-making process, the central government decided to implement the rural taxation 
reform in 20 provinces accompanied by a central transfer of RMB 25 billion and provincial 
transfers of about the same size. The nature of the reform can be summarized as 
“fee-tax-swap”, which removes all local informal fees but increases the rates of formal state 
agricultural taxes and aims to prevent arbitrary charges by the local governments and the 
“quasi-governmental” community organizations. Soon after the reform starts, it is found that 
great pressure is placed on the budgets of local governments. In some regions, a rebound of 
informal fees seems very possible.   
From a historical perspective, what is happening in rural China at the turn of the 21
st 
century is rather a rule than an exception. In China’s thousands years of history, similar 
patterns in rural taxation and reform with the feature of “fee-tax swap” have occurred 
repeatedly.
3  Very similar to the current rural tax reform, all the taxation reforms in ancient 
China aimed to replace the informal fees imposed by local governments with one or two 
unified formal state taxes to prevent excessive informal levies and corruption. However, 
what happened after all the reforms was an initial reduction or stabilization of tax burdens 
followed by resurging fees.
4 
Many scholars have paid attention to the problem of rural taxation in China. Political 
scientists frequently focus on the political system when attempting to explain surging fees on 
farmers, and argued that promoting rural elections could lead to improved local governance 
(Bernstein & Lu, 2001, Qing 2001, Cao 2001). Others have argued that the lack of financial 
resources and low shares of local government budget in total fiscal budget revenue are the 
source of high rural taxation burdens (Cao, 2001). Still others argue that lack of property 
                                                        
3  Even back to Tang dynasty in the 8
th century, the Emperor took the so-called “Two-Tax Reform ” (Liang Shui Fa), 
which essentially was intended remove all the informal charges and limit taxation to two formal state taxes(land tax and 
poll tax). In 1581, the Ming Dynasty also implemented a new taxation policy called as “One-Whip Rule ” (Yi Tai Bian Fa, 
proposed by the famous Prime Minister Zhang Juzheng) to unite all the land tax, poll tax and informal taxes into one 
formal state taxes. In 1712, the Qing Dynasty also adopted a new tax rule of    “Converting Poll Tax To Land Tax and No 
Additional Taxes Any More ”(the so-called Tang Ding Ru Mu, Yong Bu Jia fu). 
4  According to Huang Zongxi, a famous Confucian at the beginning of Qing Dynasty at the turn of 18
th 
century, the long-run effects of these rural taxation reforms were to increase rather than reduce tax 
burdens on peasants. The reason is that with the downward rigidity and frequent increases of 
government expenditures, formal tax revenues after the reform inevitably fell short of expenditures. 
This gave local governments no alternative but to re-impose informal fees, during which process 
excessive levies and corruption necessarily followed. This phenomenon of “initial taxation reduction 
after tax unification and following fee re-surge” occurred repeatedly in Chinese history was first 
systematically summarized by Huang Zongxi over three-hundred years ago, and thus was called the 
“Huang Zongxi Law”.(Qing 2001; Ren, 2002).       5
rights protection of farmers is the key to the problem of rural tax burdens, and more 
generally, the key to the slower rural income growth (Zhou, 2002). Surprisingly, there has 
not been much systematic research with empirical evidence on this issue, and no 
explanations are capable of explaining the major stylized facts under one integrated 
theoretical framework.   
This paper is the first step in a systematic study on the problem of rural taxation, and 
more generally, the problem of the relationships between government regulations and rural 
taxation, rural factor mobility, rural income growth and disparity. Part II describes the 
stylized facts on rural taxation using a large panel data set in rural China. Part III presents a 
brief general theoretical framework to explain the mechanism behind the problem of rural 
taxation with testable hypothesis. Empirical evidence is provided in Part IV. Part V 
concludes.   
 
2. Stylized Facts 
A unique characteristic of rural taxation in China is that besides formal government taxes, 
the Chinese farmers also need to pay various informal fees to local government (mainly 
township government) and village community organizations(Tao 2002, Lin etc, 2002a, 2002b). 
Based on a large panel data set covering over 6000 thousand households and 120 villages in 
10 provinces across China from 1986 to 1999,
5  we are able to describe the stylized facts of 
rural taxation for more than a decade. The most interesting finding is that, on average, there 
has been no significant increase of rural taxation as a share of rural net income in the period. In 
most provinces, total tax burdens on rural households (both formal taxation an informal fee 
charges) increased only 1-4 percentage points as a share of rural net incomes from 1986 to 1999 
and the 1990s has seen even less increase. In some more developed coastal provinces such as 
Guangdong and Zhejiang, there has been some reduction of taxation rates in the whole period. 
This is contrary to the general belief that rural taxation, and especially the excessive informal 
fee charges have increased very fast in the past 15 years, especially in 1990s. 
Then how can we reconcile the rural taxation dynamics with the fact that problem of 
rural taxation became more acute after 1990s. Further investigation shows that the main 
reason that rural direct taxation became an acute problem is the increase of rural income 
disparity after the 1990s and the uneven tax and fee distribution among different income groups. 
According to our estimation, rural Gini index in the 10 provinces increased from 0.40 to 0.47 
from 1986 to 1999, while at the same time, rural taxation incidence among different income 
groups did not change accordingly. For example, if we include all formal taxes and informal 
fees paid by rural households, the share of taxes of the lowest income group in 1986(annual per 
capita income less than RMB 200 Yuan) of net income is 10.5 percent, while that of the highest 
                                                        
5  The data set is from the Fixed Point Rural Survey carried out by the Fixed Point Rural Survey Office, i.e., the Survey 
Department of the Research Center on the Rural Economy (RCRE), at the Ministry of Agriculture in Beijing   6
income group(annual per capita income larger than RMB 4000 Yuan) is 9.5 percent. However, 
in 1999, the share of taxes of the lowest income group (annual per capita income less than RMB 
400 Yuan) in net income is 10.5 percent, while that of the highest income group (annual per 
capita income larger than RMB 8000 Yuan) is 4.4 percent. Given the income level of 
low-income groups, the higher taxation rates reduce their income significantly and further 
aggravate their poverty. Therefore, it is rather the increasingly regressive nature of rural taxation 
and the heavier burdens on poor farmers than the increase of average rural taxation level that 
caused the problem of rural taxation in China.     
The reason that the poor farmers pay much higher shares of their incomes for taxes and fees 
is connected to the agriculture-dependent nature of rural taxation in China. Taxation on the 
Chinese rural households is dominantly agricultural taxes levied on arable lands. However, after 
mid 1980s, larger share of rural income came from non-agricultural sources such as township 
and village enterprises and migration remittances, which are not subject to state tax 
administration given the ineffectiveness of the Chinese tax system. Since the poor people are 
usually the group of people with the lowest proportion of income from non-agricultural sources, 
they are more vulnerable to rural direct taxation.  
However, the income disparity explanation is only partial for at least two reasons. First, 
the fact that rural income disparity became much higher in the 1990s is something that needs 
to be explained in any worthwhile integrated theoretical framework that considers rural 
taxation. Second, the degree of rural income growth, disparity and factor mobility, and the 
size of local government expansion measured by the level of local government expenditures 
are also differentiated significantly across regions (Zhu, 2001; Xiang, 2001). Therefore, a 
more general theoretical framework is definitely needed to explain systematically these 
major stylized facts. 
 
3 A General Theoretical Framework on Rural Taxation 
3.1 Higher-Level Government Regulations Plays a Key Role 
We believe that the difficulties in reducing rural tax burdens and the problems 
encountered in the current rural taxation reform in China is due to a lack of a general 
theoretical framework with empirical support. No systematic policy recommendations and 
reform measures can be proposed without an in-depth understanding of the nature of the 
problem.  
We hold that the higher-level government regulations and interventions, such as grain 
procurement, birth control, and many other un-funded development mandates such as the 
nine-year compulsory education, play a key role putting strains on local governments. The 
intuition is as follows: since higher-level government needs local governments to implement 
regulations, but does not provide sufficient funding, and since there is an information   7
asymmetry in regulation enforcement between the two (i.e., the higher-level governments 
cannot perfectly monitor the implementation of regulations), local governments may easily 
expand local bureaucracy and engage in rent-seeking in the name of implementing the 
higher-level government regulations. Given that local government expansion encourages rent 
seeking, crowds out private investment, reduces farmer consumption, they will aggravate 
rural tax burdens and lower rural income growth. It naturally follows that the differentiated 
regulations result in differentiated bureaucratic expansions, and further lead to differentiated 
impact on tax burdens and income growth. Another channel that government regulations may 
affect rural income growth is that they may have negative impacts on rural factors (such as 
land, labor and capital) market developments and limit factor mobility. 
3.2 Homogeneous Regulation with Heterogeneous Enforcement 
An important aspect of our regulation argument is that while implemented nationally, the 
regulations are subject to heterogeneous enforcement, which leads to differential impacts across 
regions and even households. For example, the central government implemented the grain 
procurement policy in almost all provinces. However, the quantities of government grain 
procured (and the ratio of government procurement to total grain output) are very different 
across different provinces (counties, townships, villages, and even households). The quantity of 
grain procurement (and its ratio to total grain output) for every province, county, township and 
village is determined by upper level governments according to a set of rules which take in 
account the factors such as natural conditions, historical factors, and even political concerns, 
such as local food self-sufficiency. The fact is that there is sufficient differentiation in grain 
procurement regulation enforcement across regions and even across households. For the birth 
control regulation, the central government policy are much more homogeneous across regions. 
However, the difficulties in implementing the relatively homogeneous regulation also vary 
across regions. In poor areas where income is low, non-agricultural employment limited and 
female education underdeveloped, farmers usually want to have more children than their 
counterparts in richer regions. Therefore, the difficulties in implementing the relatively 
homogeneous birth control policy in poorer regions are much higher, which entails higher 
administrative costs and more staffing.  
3.3 Theoretical Hypothesis From the Regulation Framework 
With this “homogeneous regulation with heterogeneous enforcement” concept, we can build 
up an integrated theoretical framework with the following set of logically consistent hypothesis 
(due to lack of data, we describe the hypothesis only from the perspective of government grain 
procurement regulation). 
   1.Grain Procurement Regulation and Rural Taxation Hypothesis:  Controlling for other 
factors, the higher the degree of government regulation enforcement (represented by the 
government grain procurement per capita at village level), the higher the rural taxation per   8
capita.  
  2 Grain Procurement Regulation and Local Government Size and Corruption Hypothesis: 
Controlling for other factors, the higher the degree of government regulation enforcement: the 
higher the local government size (represented by the local government expenditures per 
capita), the more likely the local illegitimate fundraising and corruption. 
  3  Grain Procurement Regulation and Factor Mobility Hypothesis: the grain procurement 
regulation tends to limit the mobility of production factors such as land and labor.  
Controlling for other factors, the higher the government grain procurement per capita, or as a 
percentage of total grain output in a rural household, the less mobile its production factors, i.e., 
the less likely its land will be leased out, the less likely its labors will migrate.   
  4  Grain Procurement Regulation and Income Growth Hypothesis: by imposing heavy tax 
burdens on farmers and not contributing much to local public good provision, and also by 
limiting factor mobility and preventing local and household level comparative advantages 
from being brought into full play, grain procurement regulations also have negative effects 
on rural income growth. Controlling for other factors, the higher the government grain 
procurement per capita or as a ratio of total grain output in a rural village, the lower the income 
growth. 
If the above hypothesis hold, what follows is that with differential grain procurement 
regulation across regions (and also across households), regions (and households) that are more 
heavily regulated will have heavier rural taxation, be more vulnerable to local bureaucracy 
expansion and serious corruption, display lower factor mobility and thus lower income growth. 
The more heavily regulated regions (and households) will then be more locked in agricultural 
production, which will further lead to heavier rural taxation burden and even lower income 
growth. This constitutes a vicious cycle for these heavily regulated regions (and households), 
while the opposite happens to the less regulated regions (and households). Therefore, the 
differential regulation enforcement leads to higher rural income disparity and differentiating 
rural tax burdens.   
 
4. Empirical Analysis 
  Based on the large panel data set, we carry out empirical tests on the hypothesis drawn 
from the theoretical framework. 
   4.1 Grain Procurement Regulation and Rural Taxation Hypothesis: 
  The variable list is presented in Table 1. In Table 2 and 3, we report the results from the 
panel data fixed effect models that control both provincial and year dummies as the usual 
practices. Table 2 shows the regressions of taxes as a share of household income on grain 
quota as a share of total grain output, while in Table 3 estimations of per capita taxes on per 
capita grain quota.   9
Table 1 Variable List for Rural Taxation Hypothesis 





ij fee1   is defined as all formal state agricultural taxes plus all local levies per capita or as a share of househ
income .  j  denotes village, i  denotes household.  ij fee2 is defined as local levies per capita or as a share
household income.  ij fee3 is defined as those various local levies not legitimated by national government policy b












j Grianquota is government grain procurement quota (Kg) per capita at village level or as a share of village
 grain output( both can be viewed as exogeneous). 
ij avland is the area of operating arable land for
household.  
j ind is a variable that denote the degree of industrialization. It is the percentage of operating income of   
industrial enterprises in the gross operating income of the village. Lagged value is used to control for   
endogeneity.  j public is the degree of township and village enterprise public ownership. It is operating inco
for collective enterprise as a percentage of gross operating income of a village. Lagged value is used to cont
for endogeneity. 
ij hinc   is the per capita household net income. To control for endogeneity problem, we use the education le
of the household head and the ratio of number of family labor as to the number of family members as 
instruments and put fitted   
value in the second stage.   
j Vsize is the total population of a village. Variables are logged if a prefix “L” is added. Other control variab
such as dummy variables indicating whether the household contains a member in military solider, township a
village government, and the Communist Party are also added but omitted due to space limitation   
    
Table 2 Government Regulation and Rural Taxation Regressions 
(Tax as a Share of Income on Grain Quota as a Share of Grain Output    1986-1999) 
 (1) (2)  (3) 
 lfee1(share)  lfee2(share)  Lfee3(share) 
lgrainquota 0.100  0.068  0.013 
(share) (16.48)*** (13.23)*** (5.06)*** 
Lhinc-fitted value  -0.031  -0.029  -0.013 
 (9.14)*** (9.52)*** (7.46)*** 
Lavland 0.023  0.023 0.005 
 (15.59)*** (18.00)*** (6.80)*** 
Lvsize -0.001  -0.001  -0.003 
 (0.94)  (1.92)*  (7.85)*** 
Lpublic -0.024  -0.017 -0.002 
 (11.39)*** (9.96)*** (3.36)*** 
Lind -0.024 -0.018  -0.004 
 (11.03)*** (10.01)*** (3.99)*** 
Constant 0.217  0.194  0.105 
 (11.85)*** (11.79)*** (11.14)*** 
Observations 73421  73421  73420 
R-squared 0.11  0.12  0.05 
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Table 3 Grain Procurement Regulation and Rural Taxation Regression 
(Per Capita Tax on Per Capital villageGrain Quota 1986-1999) 
 
 (1) (2)  (3) 
  lfee1(per capita)  lfee2(per capita)  lfee3(per capita) 
lgrainquota 0.128  0.122  0.043 
(per capita)  (38.11)*** (41.80)*** (15.94)*** 
Lhinc-fitted 0.341  0.061  -0.105 
 (6.93)*** (1.80)* (3.72)*** 
Lavland 0.646  0.751  0.245 
 (45.11)*** (54.23)*** (19.34)*** 
Lvsize -0.132  -0.104  -0.035 
 (16.38)*** (12.16)*** (4.38)*** 
Lagged-public -0.738  -0.689  -0.301 
 (25.28)*** (24.66)*** (11.87)*** 
Lagged-ind -0.418  -0.505  -0.307 
 (13.82)*** (20.52)*** (13.41)*** 
Constant 0.709  1.439  1.828 
 (2.76)*** (7.92)*** (11.70)*** 
Observations 73423  73423  73422 
R-squared 0.30  0.42  0.17 
1.Robust t statistics in parentheses 
2 * significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
3 Provincial and Year Dummies Controlled 
As Table 2 and 3 indicates, for regression of  1 lfee , 2 lfee and  3 lfee , grain quota‘s 
coefficients are always positive, and are all significant at 1% level, which strongly supports 
our hypothesis. The coefficients for  lavland are always positive, meaning the larger the land 
cultivated by rural household per capita, and the higher the taxation burdens. The 
coefficients of Lpublic and  lind ’s coefficients are all negative and significant since higher 
level of public ownership and industrialization might increase local revenue, thus lower rural 
household taxation;  lhincomehas positive but less than one coefficients in all cases, which 
means that the richer pay more taxes but the taxation regime is regressive in nature. Lvsize 's 
coefficients shows there is significant economy of scale as village population grows. 
  4. 2 Grain Procurement Regulation and Local Government Size Hypothesis 
  The variable list is in Table 5 and Table 6. From the tables, we can see that the regression 
results do strongly support our hypothesis. The coefficients of grain quota are positive at 1% 
confidence level in all regressions. This means higher degree of government grain procurement 
lead to higher total local government expenditure, higher administrative fees and cadre 
expenses, and even higher corruption, i.e., local officials can spend more under unspecified   11
purposes.  









Exptotal   is defined as all village expenditure(including those submitted to upper level government 
)per capita within a village or as a share of total village net income. .     
Exptown   is defined as funds submitted to upper level governments plus village administrative fees,   
plus   “other expenditures with unspecified purposes” per capita within a village or those expenditures as a share
total village net income. 
min expvad is defined as the administration expenditure, plus village cadre subsidies and   
expenses per capita or as a share of total village net income.   
Expvother   is defined as the per capita    “other expenditures with unspecified purposes” within   
a village. The “other expenditures with unspecified purposes” can be understood as expenditures village   
cadres used for purposes that are hard to report when surveyed, therefore can be viewed expenditures 




g, , , rainquota vsize ind public   are defined as in Table 1.Lvinc   is the per capita net income 
  for the village. To control for endogeneity problem, we use the number of illiterate labors as share of 
  total labors in the village as the instrument variable and put fitted value in the second stage regression.   
 
 
Table 5 Government Regulation and Government Size Regressions 
(Government expenditure as a share of total village income on grain quota as a share of total 
grain output at village level 1995-1999) 
  Lexptotal  Lexptown  lexpvadmin  Lexpother 
Lgrainquota  0.168  0.123  0.087  0.080 
(share)  (2.115)**  (2.738)***  (2.463)***  (2.811)*** 
Lvsize  -0.012  -0.013  -0.014  -0.007 
  (-1.091)  (-2.162)**  (-2.915)***  (-1.906) 
Lagged_Ind  0.062  0.022  0.031  0.026 
  (1.767)*  (1.144)  (2.038)**  (2.102)** 
Lagged_Public  0.219  0.096  3.920  0.059 
  (4.728)***  (3.662)***  (3.920)***  (3.546)*** 
Lvinc-Fitted  -0.067  -0.028  -0.007  -0.001 
  (-1.907)*  (-1.404)  (-0.427)  (-0.073) 
Constant  0.621  0.327  0.152  0.052 
  (2.779)***  (2.584)***  (1.532)  (0.647) 
R square  0.071  0.086  0.097  0.087 
Observations  485  485  485  485 
 
The coefficients of lagged  public and  ind are also positive in all regressions and significant in 
most cases, which means that a higher levels of public ownership and industrialization are 
associated with higher village level expenditures, and manifests the fact that local cadres may 
also spend through TVEs. 
   12
Table 6: Government Regulation and Government Size Regressions 
(Per capita government expenditure on per capital grain quota at village level 1995-1999) 
  Lexptotal  Lexptown  lexpvadmin  Lexpother 
Lgrainquota  0.094  0.087  0.059  0.076 
  (3.516)***  (3.668)***  (2.126)**  (1.761)* 
Lvsize  -0.170  -0.129  -0.270  0.042 
  (-1.979)**  (-1.690)*  (-3.043)***  (0.301) 
Lagged_ind  0.590  0.332  0.652  (0.907) 
  (2.011)**  (1.272)  (2.144)**  (1.915)** 
Lagged_public  1.850  1.273  1.728  1.834 
  (4.785)***  (3.703)***  (4.314)***  (2.939)*** 
Lvinc-Fitted  0.641  0.550  0.941  0.264 
  (2.216)***  (2.137)**  (3.140)***  (0.566) 
Constant  0.565  0.584  -2.188  -0.899 
  (0.304)  (0.353)  (-1.136)  (-0.300) 
R square  0.377  0.357  0.466  0.273 
Observations  485  485  485  485 
1.Robust t statistics in parentheses 
2 * significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
3 Provincial and Year Dummies Controlled 
 
4.3 Grain Procurement Regulation and Factor Mobility Hypothesis. 
  We also carried out empirical tests of the Grain Procurement Regulation and Factor 
Mobility Hypothesis using the Probit and Tobit model. We find that that under all 
circumstances, food regulation (represented by the amount of grain quota as a share of total 
grain output or per capita grain quota,) does have negative impact on the probability of land 
lease-out after controlling the household’s agricultural technical efficiency, tax as a share of 
household income, the share of labor in a household, and the amount of the capital and per 
capita land in a household, the education level and age of household head, village 
industrialization level, degree of village public ownership, off-farm opportunity. For the labor 
mobility, similar empirical tests are carried out with the finding that in all cases, grain 
procurement regulation has negative impact on the probability of labor migration for a 
household, after controlling for tax as a share of household income, the share of labor in a 
household, and per capita land in a household, the education level and age of household head, 
village industrialization level, degree of village public ownership, off-farm opportunity. In 
conclusion, the regression results support our hypothesis of the negative impact of grain 
procurement regulation on factor mobility. 
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Rentout   is a dummy indicating whether a household rent out his land.  Rentoutarea   is the area of
land rented out of a household..  migprob is a dummy indicating whether there is a member migrating out
migtime is the earnings of migrating out for work of a    household. 
 
Independent  
grainquotapc is grain quota per capita for a household,  grainquotashare is grain quota as   
a share of grain output of a household.  te is the agricultural technical efficiency of a household using the 
stochastic frontier approach.  laborshareis the share of labor out of the number of 
 family  members.asset is the real value of household 
agricultural productive assets.  headedu is the education level of household head and  headageis 
  the age of household head.  laboredu   is the share if illiterate labor in a household.  offfarm   is the sh
of migrants out of total number of labors in the village.suburb  is a dummy indicating whether the village 
locates in a city suburb.  ,, ind public avland   are defined as in Table 1. 
  To control for endogeneity problem, we use lagged values for some variables   
Table 8 Grain Procurement Regulation and Land Rental(1995-1999) 
  (1)Probit  (2)Probit  (3) Tobit  (4) Tobit 
  rentout  rentout  Rentout Area  Rentout Area 
Grainquotashare -0.675    -4.46   
 (3.72)***  (4.82)***  
Grainquotapc   -0.001    -0.006 
   (5.19)***   (6.19)*** 
Te -0.462  -0.481  -3.050  -3.147 
 (7.70)*** (7.98)*** (8.86)*** (9.24)*** 
Avland 0.0424  0.051  0.319  0.382 
 (4.69)*** (5.55)*** (5.25)*** (6.08)*** 
Laborshare -0.050  -0.045  -0.210  -0.172 
 (0.76)  (0.68)  (0.55)  (0.46) 
Lag_asset -0.034  -0.035  -0.213  -0.214 
 (6.73)*** (6.83)*** (7.02)*** (7.08)*** 
Headedu 0.004  0.002  0.090  0.076 
 (0.21)  (0.08)  (0.84)  (0.72) 
headage 0.002  0.003  0.013  0.013 
 (1.71)*  (1.71)  (1.55)  (1.57) 
Lagged_public  0.108 0.117 0.880  0.970 
 (1.10)  (1.19)  (1.56)  (1.71)* 
Lagged_ind 0.233  0.225  1.470  1.421 
 (3.47)*** (3.37)*** (3.60)*** (3.48)*** 
Lag_offfarm 0.167  0.160  1.216  1.187 
 (3.42)**  (3.36)**  (3.18)*** (3.14)*** 
Suburb 0.047  0.044  0.328  0.303 
 (2.30)*  (2.12)*  (2.71)*** (2.51)** 
Constant -1.618  -1.627  -9.93 -9.92 
 (16.56)**  (16.61)**  (15.81)*** (15.84)*** 
Observations 22757  22757  22757  22757 
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Table 9 Grain Procurement Regulation and Labor Mobilty(1995-1999) 
 
 (1)  (2) 
 migprob  Migtob 
Grainquotashare  -0.210 -1,894.611 
  (2.67)*** (1.99)** 
Laboredu  -0.442 -4,881.787 
  (11.88)*** (10.62)*** 
Avland  -0.031 -552.722 
  (3.93)*** (5.81)*** 
Headedu  -0.090 -564.334 
  (7.65)*** (4.08)*** 
Headage  0.003 30.061 
  (3.98)*** (3.02)*** 
Lagged_public  -0.028 1,131.558 
  (0.46) (1.55) 
Lagged_ind  -0.111 504.055 
  (2.88)*** (1.10) 
Lag_offfarm  0.592 5,565.565 
  (7.68)*** (10.71)*** 
Surburb  -0.006 -4,908.733 
  (0.12) (8.56)*** 
Constant 0.007  -4,908.733 
 (0.13)  (8.56)*** 
Observations 22531  22531 
1.Robust t statistics in parentheses 
2 * significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
3 Provincial and Year Dummies Controlled 
 
4.4    Grain Procurement Regulation and Income Growth Hypothesis 
    Table 10 and 11 are the variable list and regression results respectively. From Table 
11, we find that the food procurement proxy always has negative and statistically significant 
coefficients, and the coefficients are always very large. Labor growth and education 
attainment’s impact are not significant, but investment rate has positive effects on growth. In 
addition, the government expenditure as a percentage of total village income ( gov a_ ) has 
negative coefficients, but significant only in column (1), which might be due to the fact that we 
put both food regulation proxy ( food a_ ) and government expenditure variable ( gov a_ ) into 
the equation, but the former has positive impact on the latter. However, we also find that 
3 _ gov a , which represents the proportion of all village expenditures used in local public goods 
provision in total village organization expenditures does have positive impact on rural income   15
growth (similar results can be found for coefficients of  1 _ gov a  and  2 _ gov a ). These results 
support our argument that local expenditure is not mainly used in providing local public goods 
that can promote local productivity and income growth. 
 
Table 10 Variable List for Income Growth Hypothesis   
 
Variable Definitions 









95 _vinc a   is the net income per capita for village in 1995, used as initial income level variable.   
food a_   is the average grain procurement as a percentage of total grain production in a village 
labg a_  is the village labor growth rate during the same period,  invest a_  is the average villa
investment rate from 1995 to 1999.    edu a_ is the average proportion of labors with education of second
school and above in the total labor force for a village from 1995 to 1999.   gov a_  is the average villa
organization expenditure (including those submitted to higher level government such as township funds) a
percentage of total village income.. 
1 _ gov a  is the average collective reproduction expenditure (such as new collective enterprise investment) a
percentage of village organization expenditure. 
2 _ gov a is the average household reproduction expenditure from village budget (such as new collect
investment) as a percentage of total village organization expenditure.   
3 _ gov a is the average collective and household reproduction expenditure plus transportation and educat
pooling funds as a percentage of total village organization expenditure, which represents the proportion of villa
expenditure used in local public goods provision in total village organization expenditure.     
4 _ gov a   is the average village expenditure submitted to higher-level government (mainly the township pool
funds) as a percentage of village organization expenditure. 
1 _ gov a is the average social transfer expenditure as a percentage of village expenditure. 
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Table 11    Government Regulation and Rural Income Growth Regressions 
 (1)  (2)  (3) 
Vinc95 -0.000015  -0.000004  -0.000008 





 (-1.77)  (-2.35)  (-1.73) 
A_labg 0.051  0.023  0.039 





 (2.69)  (3.42)  (2.51) 
A_edu -0.014 0.0001  -0.0046 
 (-0.29)  (0.003)  (-0.09) 
A_gov -0.186
* -0.153 -0.168 
 (-1.6666016)  (-1.55988)  (-1.55199) 
A_gove1 0.111
*   0.209
*** 
 (1.77)  (2.78) 
A_gove2 0.106    0.24
** 
 (1.24)  (2.16) 
A_gove3   0.129
**  
   (2.38)   
A_gove4     0.112* 
    (1.93) 
A_gove5     0.173* 
    (1.73) 
Obs 102     
Adj R
2 0.22  0.24  0.26 
F 1.99  1.89  2.5 
Note：  1, t statistics in the parenthesis      2,”*” ,“**”, “***”means the corresponding coefficient 
is significant at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. 
 
Part IV: Conclusions. 
In this paper, we try to reconcile the stylized facts that the average level of rural taxation 
relative to rural net income after the 1990s did not increase very fast, but rural taxation 
became a very serious problem in this period in a general theoretical framework. We found 
that this is in large part due to the increase of rural income disparity after 1990s and the 
uneven tax and fee distribution among different income groups. We argue that differentiated 
enforcement of the government regulations such as grain procurement and birth control play 
an important role in the rural taxation problem, and more generally, the problem of 
expanding government size and rising rural income disparity. The empirical findings do 
support our hypothesis.   
  If our theory holds, a final solution to the problem of heavy rural taxation and rising 
income disparity should be the removal or at least relaxation of the central government   17
economic and social regulations on rural areas. If the government regulations such as grain 
procurement did lower rural income growth of the heavily regulated regions and households 
by increasing rural tax burdens and limiting labor and land mobility, removing or relaxing 
the government regulations will not only reduce the rural tax burdens and channel more tax 
revenues toward rural public goods provision, but also promote rural factor mobility, and 
thus increase rural income growth and promote rural income. Only with the un-funded 
mandates and government regulations removed, it is possible to break out of the Huang Zongxi 
Law that have daunted China for thousands of years and begin to establish a modern system of 
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